Islamabad, Pakistan – Security forces in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan say they have concluded a military operation against armed separatists who hijacked the Peshawar-bound Jaffar Express on Tuesday, rescuing 346 passengers.

Officials said the military had killed all 33 of the attackers from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).

The train, carrying nearly 400 passengers, had left Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, in the morning when it was intercepted by BLA fighters near a series of tunnels, about 160km (100 miles) away.

General Ahmed Sharif , director general of the Inter Services Public Relations, the military’s media wing confirmed that 27 civilians — including the train driver — and one paramilitary soldier involved in the operation had also been killed.

State Interior Minister Tallal Chaudhry told Al Jazeera that the fighters had used several hostages as “human shields”.

In recent years, the BLA has significantly expanded the scale and sophistication of its operations – conducting more than 150 attacks last year alone – culminating in this recent train hijacking.

But what is the BLA, when was it created, who are its leaders, what are the group’s demands, and how has it managed to wage a battle with the state for several years?

Why is there a secessionist movement in Balochistan?

Balochistan – Pakistan’s largest but least populous province – has a long history of marginalisation.

The province was annexed by Pakistan in 1948, six months after its partition from India in August 1947, and has witnessed several separatist movements ever since.

Home to about 15 million of Pakistan’s estimated 240 million people, according to the 2023 census, Balochistan remains the country’s poorest region despite being rich in natural resources such as coal, gold, copper, and gas. These resources generate substantial revenue for the federal government.

The province is also home to one of Pakistan’s major deep-sea ports at Gwadar, a crucial trade corridor for the $62bn China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which aims to link southwestern China to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan.

However, Baloch nationalists allege that the Pakistani state has neglected their people while exploiting the province’s resources, triggering separatist movements and armed rebellions.

When was the BLA created, and what led to its formation?

Balochistan has witnessed at least five separatist uprisings since Pakistan’s formation in 1947.

The latest wave began in the early 2000s, initially focused on securing a larger share of the province’s resources for its people but soon escalating into calls for complete independence.

With growing resentment towards the state, the BLA emerged in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Analysts studying Baloch resistance movements say it was led by Balach Marri, son of veteran Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri.

The rebellion intensified in 2006 after the government, under military ruler Pervez Musharraf, killed prominent Baloch nationalist leader Nawab Akbar Bugti.

Balach Marri was also killed a year later, and the government subsequently banned the BLA. Balach Marri’s father, Nawab Khair Baksh Marri, passed away in December 2014.

Over the years, the BLA has distinguished itself as a group committed to Balochistan’s complete independence from Pakistan.

Unlike moderate Baloch nationalist groups advocating provincial autonomy, the BLA has never pursued a middle ground.

Malik Siraj Akbar, a researcher specialising in the Baloch separatist movement, says that while the BLA’s core demand for an independent Balochistan remains unchanged, its leadership, operational geography, and strategies have evolved over time.

“Today, the BLA operates with little to no influence from the Marri tribe. Instead, its leadership has shifted to educated Baloch figures, many of whom were once part of the non-violent Baloch Students Organization (BSO),” he told Al Jazeera.

Who are the major leaders of the BLA?

The BLA took up arms against the Pakistani state due to what it considered the federal government’s “continuous misadventures”, which, it claimed, undermined genuine political and socioeconomic progress in the province.

Akbar notes that the BLA was initially a very secretive organisation, but a significant shift occurred when leadership transitioned from Marri tribesmen to middle-class Baloch leaders.

“The new leadership displayed a greater tendency to showcase their power and capabilities in the media. Among them, the most prominent figures include Aslam Baloch, who was later killed in 2018, and, more recently, Bashir Zaib, former student leader of the BSO,” Akbar added.

Fahad Nabeel, who leads the Islamabad-based research consultancy Geopolitical Insights, says Bashir Zaib Baloch is the current leader of the BLA and was likely behind the Jaffar Express hijacking.

Bashir Zaib, in his mid-40s, belongs to the Nushki district of Balochistan, situated 150km (93 miles) south of Quetta. He earned a diploma from a polytechnical college in Quetta.

“After Aslam Baloch’s death in a bomb attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the group’s leadership passed to Bashir Zaib Baloch,” Nabeel told Al Jazeera.

In 2010, the group launched its suicide squad – the Majeed Brigade, which remained dormant for a few years then came into prominence in 2018 when Aslam Baloch sent his own son to target Chinese engineers working in the Balochistan city of Dalbandin. The attack injured five people, including the three Chinese nationals, but there were no fatalities, apart from Aslam’s son.

That sparked a broader trend of the BLA attacking Chinese citizens and installations in recent years.

The group attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi in November 2018, a month before Aslam Baloch’s death. Four people were killed, including two policemen, while the Chinese staff remained safe. Security forces were able to quell the attack within an hour, killing all three assailants.

However, Akbar notes that the BLA’s Majeed Brigade truly gained global attention when one of its female suicide bombers, Shari Baloch, targeted Chinese nationals at Karachi University in 2022.

At least four people were killed, including three Chinese nationals, after Shari, a 30-year-old woman, blew up a minivan outside the university’s Confucius Institute, a Chinese language and cultural centre.

“While Bashir Zaib introduced female militants, his deputy, Hammal Rehan, oversees Majeed Brigade’s operations,” Nabeel said.

Rehan is also in his mid-40s and is believed to be well-educated, with command over several languages, including English, Urdu and Persian.

According to Nabeel, a former Pakistani military official turned renegade, Rehman Gul Baloch, has significantly enhanced the group’s capabilities.

The former military man is in his early 40s, and is also from Nushki. A graduate of the University of Peshawar, he joined the Pakistan Army in 2002, but within eight years, decided to quit and join the BLA.

Rehman Gul Baloch, Nabeel said, has helped the group improve its “combat skills, enabling it to move from hit-and-run attacks to large-scale operations”.

How does the BLA recruit fighters?

Observers say the BLA’s greatest strength is its ability to enlist young, well-schooled soldiers.

“Recruiting young, educated fighters is no longer a challenge, as the group enjoys significant popularity among Baloch youth, despite the controversial nature of its operations,” Akbar says.

He adds that despite the group’s responsibility for civilian deaths, including Baloch citizens, and its use of female suicide bombers, such tactics have drawn only limited criticism.

“Instead, its appeal has grown among young Baloch, many of whom believe armed struggle is the only viable path for their people’s survival,” he added.

Imtiaz Baloch, a researcher at The Khorasan Diary (TKD), a platform tracking regional security, added that the BLA was able to gain sympathy among the people in part due to the state’s “incompetence”.

“High-handed state policies, bad governance, lack of accountability, and cases of enforced disappearances have become catalysts for militants to recruit and influence more sympathizers, including people with highly educated backgrounds such as professional IT experts, data analysts, and other professionals, thereby broadening their reach and social media influence,” he told Al Jazeera.

How does the BLA fund its operations?

While the BLA’s funding sources remain unclear, analysts suggest multiple revenue streams, including illicit activities such as extortion, smuggling and drug trafficking.

The Pakistan government claims India funds the BLA, but Akbar, who says that most of the BLA leadership is in Pakistan after spending years in Afghanistan, says those assertions are hard to accept at face value.

“Given Pakistan’s tendency to blame India for almost every issue, such claims are difficult to accept without solid evidence,” he said. “If the government provides concrete proof of Indian support, only then will its accusations hold weight. What is clear, however, is that the BLA has a well-funded backer, and its fighters receive highly professional training tailored specifically for insurgency.”

Islamabad-based Imtiaz Baloch from The Khorasan Diary, however, said income from massive coal mines in Balochistan province is a main economic source for the group.

“The recent operations by the separatist Baloch armed groups have been highly effective, as they have utilised many American weapons. Following their withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, it was easy to procure [these] from the porous border it shares with Afghanistan,” he added.

Nabeel, on the other hand, said that he believes most of the BLA leadership is operating out of Iran and Afghanistan. He argued that the group generates funds from multiple illicit activities ranging from drug trafficking to kidnapping people for ransom.

“Certain individuals from the Baloch diaspora also provide financial support,” he said. “Their training takes place in Iran, Afghanistan, and certain parts of Balochistan, whereas weapons are procured from black markets operating in Iran and Afghanistan, along with leftover American weapons.”

How does the BLA build its narrative?

Akbar said that the failure of governance and “dissatisfaction” with the provincial government help the BLA increase its influence among a disenchanted public.

“Many view it [the provincial government] as more loyal to Islamabad than to the people of Balochistan, particularly because it refuses to take a stand on critical issues like enforced disappearances,” he said.

Muhammad Shoaib, an academic and a security analyst at the Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, said that the group has managed to spread its message using social media.

“BLA has learned the art of staying in news and keeping the state apparatus engaged on multiple fronts. The quantity of attacks and fronts tell us that BLA’s recruitment is increasing and now it can dedicate more resources and personnel for operations,” he told Al Jazeera.

Nabeel said that the BLA has honed its “propaganda efforts” in recent years, and noted that the group’s media outlet “provides timely updates on militant activities and publishes literature and combat videos to attract potential recruits”.