Conflict Zones
‘Don’t see a major war with India, but have to be ready’: Pakistan ex-NSA | Border Disputes News

Islamabad, Pakistan – Eleven days after gunmen shot 26 people dead in the scenic valley of Baisaran in Indian-administered Kashmir’s Pahalgam, India and Pakistan stand on the brink of a military standoff.
The nuclear-armed neighbours have each announced a series of tit-for-tat steps against the other since the attack on April 22, which India has implicitly blamed Pakistan for, even as Islamabad has denied any role in the killings.
India has suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty that enforces a water-sharing mechanism Pakistan depends on. Pakistan has threatened to walk away from the 1972 Simla Agreement that committed both nations to recognising a previous ceasefire line as a Line of Control (LoC) – a de-facto border – between them in Kashmir, a disputed region that they each partly control but that they both claim in its entirety. Both nations have also expelled each other’s citizens and scaled back their diplomatic missions.
Despite a ceasefire agreement being in place since 2021, the current escalation is the most serious since 2019, when India launched air strikes on Pakistani soil following an attack on Indian soldiers in Pulwama, in Indian-administered Kashmir, that killed 40 troops. In recent days, they have traded fire across the LoC.
And the region is now on edge, amid growing expectations that India might launch a military operation against Pakistan this time too.
Yet, both countries have also engaged their diplomatic partners. On Wednesday, United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Indian Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, urging both sides to find a path to de-escalation. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth called his Indian counterpart, Rajnath Singh, on Thursday to condemn the attack and offered “strong support” to India.
Sharif met envoys from China, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, three of Pakistan’s closest allies, to seek their support, and urged the ambassadors of the two Gulf nations to “impress upon India to de-escalate and defuse tensions”.
To understand how Pakistani strategists who have worked on ties with India view what might happen next, Al Jazeera spoke with Moeed Yusuf, who served as Pakistan’s national security adviser (NSA) between May 2021 and April 2022 under former Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Prior to his role as NSA, Yusuf also worked as a special adviser to Khan on matters related to national security starting in December 2019, four months after the Indian government, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, revoked the special status of Indian-administered Kashmir.

Based in Lahore, Yusuf is currently the vice chancellor of a private university and has authored and edited several books on South Asia and regional security. His most recent book, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments: US Crisis Management in South Asia, was published in 2018.
Al Jazeera: How do you assess moves made by both sides so far in the crisis?
Moeed Yusuf: India and Pakistan have for long struggled in terms of crisis management. They don’t have a bilateral crisis management mechanism, which is the fundamental concern.
The number one crisis management tool used by both sides has been the reliance on third parties, with the idea being that they would try and restrain them both and help de-escalate the crisis.
This time, I feel the problem India has run into is that they followed the old playbook, but the leader of the most important third party, the United States, didn’t show up to support India.
It appears that they have so far taken a neutral and a hands-off position, as indicated by President Donald Trump few days ago. (Trump said that he knew the leaders of both India and Pakistan, and believed that they could resolve the crisis on their own.)
Pakistan’s response is directly linked to the Indian response, and that is historically how it has been, with both countries going tit-for-tat with each other. This time too, a number of punitive steps have been announced.
The problem is that these are easy to set into motion but very difficult to reverse, even when things get better, and they may wish to do so.
Unfortunately, in every crisis between them, the retaliatory steps are becoming more and more substantive, as in this case, India has decided to hold Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, which is illegal as the treaty provides no such provision.
Al Jazeera: Do you believe a strike is imminent and if both sides are indicating preparedness for a showdown?
Yusuf: In such moments, it is impossible to say. Action from India remains plausible and possible, but the window where imminence was a real concern has passed.
What usually happens in crises is that countries pick up troop or logistics movements, or their allies inform them, or they rely on ground intelligence to determine what might happen. Sometimes, these can be misread and can lead the offensive side to see an opportunity to act where none exists or the defensive side to believe an attack may be coming when it isn’t the case.
Pakistan naturally has to show commitment to prepare for any eventuality. You don’t know what will come next, so you have to be ready.
Having said that, I don’t think we are going to see a major war, but in these circumstances, you can never predict, and one little misunderstanding or miscalculation can lead to something major.
Al Jazeera: How do you see the role of third parties such as the US, China and Gulf States in this crisis, and how would you compare it with previous instances?
Yusuf: My last book, Brokering Peace (2018) was on the third-party management in Pakistan-India context, and this is such a vital element for both as they have internalised and built it into their calculus that a third-party country will inevitably come in.
The idea is that a third-party mediator will step in, and the two nations will agree to stop because that is what they really want, instead of escalating further.
And the leader of the pack of third-party countries is the United States since the Kargil war of 1999. (Pakistani forces crossed the LoC to try to take control of strategic heights in Ladakh’s Kargil, but India eventually managed to take back the territory. Then-US President Bill Clinton is credited with helping end that conflict.)
Everybody else, including China, ultimately backs the US position, which prioritises immediate de-escalation above all else during the crisis.
This changed somewhat in the 2016 surgical strikes and 2019 Pulwama crisis when the US leaned heavily on India’s side, perhaps unwittingly even emboldening them to act in 2019.
(In 2016, Indian troops launched a cross-border “surgical strike” that New Delhi said targeted armed fighters planning to attack India, after gunmen killed 19 Indian soldiers in an attack on an army base in Uri, Indian-administered Kashmir. Three years later, Indian fighter jets bombed what New Delhi said were bases of “terrorists” in Balakot, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, after the attack on the Indian military convoy in which 40 soldiers were killed. India and Pakistan then engaged in an aerial dogfight, and an Indian pilot was captured and subsequently returned.)
However, this time, you have a president in the White House who turned around and told both Pakistan and India to figure it out themselves.
This, I think, has hurt India more than Pakistan, because for Pakistan, they had discounted the possibility of significant US support in recent years, thinking they have gotten too close to India due to their strategic relationship.
But India would have been hoping for the Americans to put their foot down and pressure Pakistan, which did not exactly materialise. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s phone call again is playing down the middle, where they are telling both the countries to get out of war.
So, what they have done has, oddly enough, still played a role in holding India back so far, since India didn’t (so far) feel as emboldened to take action as they may have during Pulwama in 2019.
Gulf countries have played a more active role than before. China, too, has made a statement of restraint.

Al Jazeera: How has Pakistan’s relationship with India evolved in recent years?
Yusuf: There has been a sea change in the relationship between the two countries. When I was in office, despite serious problems and India’s unilateral moves in Kashmir in 2019, we saw a ceasefire agreement on the Line of Control as well as back-channel talks.
We have tried to move ahead and reduce India’s incentive to destabilise Pakistan, but I think India has lost that opportunity due to its own intransigence, hubris and an ideological bent that continues to force them to demean and threaten Pakistan.
That has led to a change in Pakistan as well, where the leadership is now convinced that the policy of restraint did not deliver, and India has misused and abused Pakistan’s offers for dialogue.
The view now is that if India doesn’t want to talk, Pakistan shouldn’t be pleading either. If India does reach out, we will likely respond, but there isn’t any desperation in Pakistan at all.
This is not a good place to be for either country. I have long believed and argued that ultimately for Pakistan to get to where we want to go economically, and for India to get to where it says it wants to go regionally, it cannot happen unless both improve their relationship. For now, though, with the current Indian attitude, unfortunately, I see little hope.
Al Jazeera: Do you anticipate any direct India-Pakistan talks at any level during or after this crisis?
Yes – I don’t know when it will be, or who will it be through or with, but I think one of the key lessons Indians could probably walk away with once all this is over is that attempting to isolate Pakistan isn’t working.
Indus Water Treaty in abeyance? Simla Agreement’s potential suspension? These are major decisions, and the two countries will need to talk to sort these out, and I think at some point in future they will engage.
But I also don’t think that Pakistan will make a move towards rapprochement, as we have offered opportunities for dialogues so many times recently to no avail. As I said, the mood in Pakistan has also firmed up on this question.
Ultimately, the Indians need to basically decide if they want to talk or not. If they come forth, I think Pakistan will still respond positively to it.
*This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
Conflict Zones
Philippines election results: Who won, who lost and what’s next? | Elections News

Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, detained at the International Criminal Court (ICC), is on course to win the mayoral election in his home Davao City, and five candidates backed by his family are leading the Senate race as midterm election results appear to show the Duterte political dynasty’s continued grip on power.
The results are a big boost for Vice President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter, who faces impeachment by the Senate in July. A two-thirds majority is required to remove her from office and bar her from running in future elections, including the 2028 presidential one.
Twelve out of 24 Senate seats and all 317 seats in the House of Representatives were among the 18,320 elective positions up for grabs in the key election. Nearly 69 million people were registered to vote in the Asia Pacific country.
Who won the election?
With 97 percent of the votes reported, candidates backed by President Marcos Jr are on course to win six of the 12 seats in the Senate.
Duterte’s supporters, including staunch ally Christopher “Bong” Go are set to win five seats. One candidate who is winning a seat has been affiliated with both political families.
Rodrigo Duterte is set to win the mayoral seat in Davao after receiving more than 65 percent of the votes.
Duterte was the mayor of the southern city thrice, serving a total of 22 years. If he wins, it is likely that the role would be assumed by the city’s vice mayor, a position currently held by his son, Sebastian Duterte.
In the Philippines, candidates facing criminal charges, including those in detention, can run for office unless they are convicted.
What’s at stake?
While President Marcos Jr and Vice President Sara Duterte were not on the poll, their candidates were vying for positions from the Senate to municipal offices.
Sara Duterte is a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. Her political future can be decided by the 24-member Senate. She requires support of nine Senate members to avoid conviction.
The 12 elected Senators will form half of the jury in her impeachment trial, which is tentatively set for July. If found guilty, she will be removed from office and barred from contesting future elections.
She was impeached by the House of Representatives in February after being accused of crimes ranging from the misuse of public funds to plotting Marcos’s assassination.
Sara Duterte says the impeachment is part of a political vendetta as the two families battle for power.
The fate of hundreds of governors and thousands of seats for city mayor and municipal mayors were also decided in this election.
The official results will be out within a week.
What is the political rivalry between the Marcos and Duterte families?
Sara Duterte is the daughter of former President Duterte, who was arrested and flown to the ICC at The Hague on March 11 by the Marcos Jr administration.
The elder Duterte was accused of “crimes against humanity” for the estimated deaths of 30,000 people during his tenures as mayor and president.
More than 7,000 people were killed during anti-drug operations while he was in power between 2016 and 2022, according to police records. Human rights advocates suggest the actual death toll was higher.
Marcos Jr allied with the Duterte family, which enjoyed popularity, during his successful 2022 presidential campaign, with Sara Duterte as his running mate. But the ties soon soured over policy differences and Marcos’s rejection of the war on drugs launched by Sara Duterte’s father, Rodrigo Duterte.
Finally, the alliance crumbled due to faltering support for Marcos Jr among supporters of the Duterte family after the arrest of Apollo Quiboloy, who was the spiritual adviser of former President Duterte. Quibology, an influential pastor, was charged with sex trafficking.
The arrest of Rodrigo Duterte on a warrant issued by the ICC further inflamed tension between the two political dynasties.
Until Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest, Marcos Jr repeatedly rejected the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over his country, deeming the ICC “a threat” to the country’s sovereignty. Marcos Jr had held he would not assist the ICC in the elder Duterte’s arrest.
“Let me say this for the 100th time. I do not recognise the jurisdiction of ICC in the Philippines. The Philippine government will not lift a finger to help any investigation that the ICC conducts,” Marcos Jr said in early 2024.
In 2019, (Rodrigo) Duterte had removed the Philippines from the ICC, meaning the country was not required to detain someone with an ICC warrant against their name.
The political tensions between the Duterte family and Marcos Jr reached a crescendo when the younger Duterte was impeached this February. She remains VP, but a Senate trial hangs like the sword of Damocles over her head.
Conflict Zones
‘No guardrails’: How India-Pakistan combat obliterated old red lines | India-Pakistan Tensions News

New Delhi, India – Guns have fallen silent for now along the tense India-Pakistan frontier, after a ceasefire that appears to have held for three nights.
On May 7, India launched predawn attacks on what it called multiple “terror sites” across Pakistan to avenge the April 22 killing of 26 men, almost all of them tourists, in Indian-administered Kashmir’s resort town of Pahalgam. New Delhi accused Islamabad of backing the gunmen. Pakistan denied its involvement.
India’s aerial assault kick-started four days of heightened tension, as both neighbours fired missiles and drones at each other’s military installations in a rapidly escalating cycle that brought them to the brink of full-scale war.
Both sides have claimed to have decisively damaged, even destroyed, the other’s key strategic facilities, even though early evidence suggests more limited damage to military bases in both India and Pakistan.
Yet even as India and Pakistan arrived at a ceasefire that United States President Donald Trump insists his administration brokered, experts say something has indeed been decimated, potentially beyond repair: Old red lines that had defined the tense relationship between the South Asian neighbours.
“India and Pakistan have entered a phase of ‘armed coexistence’ with little room for diplomacy and a narrow margin for error, despite having a live and sensitive border,” Praveen Donthi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group in New Delhi, told Al Jazeera.
“This situation does not bode well for either country or the region, because even accidental triggers could escalate into a war-like situation with no guardrails in place.”
India-Pakistan dispute: Who settles it?
The seeds of the India-Pakistan conflict were sown when their independence from British rule in 1947 was accompanied by a partition of the Indian subcontinent to create Pakistan.
Since then, the two neighbours have fought four wars, three of them over Kashmir, a region they both control partially along with China, which governs two thin slices in the north. India claims all of Kashmir, while Pakistan claims all parts other than the ones governed by China, its ally.
After their 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed what is known as the Simla Agreement, which said “the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.”
While Pakistan has often cited United Nations resolutions to argue for international involvement in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India has cited the Simla Agreement for more than half a century to insist that any negotiations between the countries be strictly bilateral.
To be sure, the US has since intervened to calm tensions between India and Pakistan: In 1999, for instance, President Bill Clinton pressured Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw troops from the icy heights of Indian-controlled Kargil, where they had entered. However, Washington publicly played coy about its role, allowing India to insist that the US had only helped with crisis management, not any dispute resolution mediation.
That changed on Saturday, when US President Donald Trump upstaged New Delhi and Islamabad to announce a “full and immediate” India-Pakistan ceasefire hours before the governments of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi or his Pakistani counterpart Shehbaz Sharif confirmed the development.
The next day, Trump went further. “I will work with you, both to see if, after a ‘thousand years,’ a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir,” he posted on his Truth Social platform.
And on Monday, merely 30 minutes before Modi was scheduled for his first address since India launched attacks in Pakistan, Trump told reporters at the White House that his administration had leveraged trade to reach a ceasefire. “Let’s stop [the fighting]. If you stop it, we’ll do a trade. If you don’t stop it, we’re not going to do any trade,” Trump said. “And all of a sudden they said, ‘I think we’re going to stop.’ For a lot of reasons, but trade is a big one.”
Such US mediation, were it to happen, would shatter India’s longstanding red line against mediation by other countries, say experts.
“India has consistently sought to avoid third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute even as it has occasionally welcomed third-party help in crisis management,” Christopher Clary, a former Pentagon official and a non-resident fellow at the Washington, DC-based Stimson Center, told Al Jazeera.
When he spoke, Modi largely stuck to traditional positions he has taken after previous bouts of tension with Pakistan. He said “terror and talks cannot happen together,” and “water and blood cannot flow together,” a reference to the Indus Waters Treaty for sharing water between India and Pakistan, which New Delhi walked out of after the Pahalgam attack.
Unlike Pakistan PM Sharif, who expressed gratitude to Trump for brokering a ceasefire, Modi claimed that India had “only paused” its military action – noting the decision was taken bilaterally. He did not mention Trump or his administration.
Regardless, “the spectre of international intervention” in Kashmir has been resurrected, said Sumantra Bose, political scientist and the author of the 2021 book Kashmir at the Crossroads. He said India’s furious barrage of missiles and drones at Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam killings “catered to domestic jingoism but naturally roused global alarm”.
India might, however, be helped in avoiding actual US intervention in Kashmir by the immediacy of the Trump administration’s other foreign policy goals, like the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, “that will divert already overburdened [American] policymakers to other tasks”, said Clary.
Unprecedented targets
According to Bose, India and Pakistan crossed not just red lines, “but a Rubicon by attacking numerous high-population targets in cities and towns” last week.
India, in its most expansive offensive against Pakistan outside full-blown wars, said it hit “terrorist infrastructure” on May 7 as part of what it called Operation Sindoor. That was a reference to the vermillion that married Hindu women apply to their forehead, and an allusion to the manner in which the Pahalgam attack appears to have unfolded: Multiple witness accounts suggest the attackers segregated the men, then picked and hit non-Muslims.
Modi claimed, in his Monday statement, that the Indian attacks had killed more than 100 “terrorists”. Pakistan has insisted that only 31 civilians – including two children – were killed in the May attacks.
Yet both sides agree that the Indian missiles struck not just two cities – Muzaffarrabad and Kotli – in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but also four cities in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the county’s economic heart and home to 60 percent of its population. The targets were Bahawalpur, Muridke, Shakar Garh and a village near Sialkot. This was the first time that India had struck Punjab since the 1971 war.
As tensions spiked, India accused Pakistan of unleashing a swarm of drones towards it – a charge Islamabad denied. Then India launched a wave of drones that reached Pakistan’s biggest population centres, including its two biggest cities, Karachi and Lahore. In the early hours of May 10, India and Pakistan fired missiles at each other’s military bases across multiple provinces – far beyond disputed Kashmir – even hitting a few.
Pakistan, which called its campaign Operation Bunyan Marsoos (a structure made of lead, in Arabic), targeted Indian air force bases and missile storage facilities in Drangyari, Udhampur, Uri and Nagrota (all in Indian-administered Kashmir), as well as in Pathankot, Beas and Adampur in Indian Punjab and Bhuj in Gujarat, Modi’s home state. Indian armed forces said that while they shot down most incoming missiles and drones, four air force bases suffered “limited damage”.
“We don’t know what the quantum [of Indian losses] are, but clearly Pakistan has demonstrated capability to impose costs on India even as we try to impose costs on them,” Indian military historian and strategic analyst Srinath Raghavan told Al Jazeera.
“Regarding red lines, another thing Pakistan sought to demonstrate was that they could keep this [the fighting] going till they had hit Indian military installations in retaliation.”
Meanwhile, India too targeted the Nur Khan airbase near Rawalpindi, Murid airbase in Chakwal and the Rafiqui airbase in Shorkot.
“India has shown that it is willing and capable of carrying out more strikes across the border, whether it’s a terrorist or even military infrastructure in Pakistan,” Raghavan said. India’s response went far beyond what happened in 2019, when Indian jets bombed what they described as a “terrorist camp” in Balakot, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, after a suicide bomber killed more than 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers.
Now, the 2025 attacks will serve as the new baseline for India, experts said.
“India would respond [in the future] on a similar scale, perhaps even a little bit more. Given the way both Balakot and the current crisis have played out, that should be the expectation,” said Raghavan.
Other weapons: Water to peace pacts
It isn’t just missiles and drones that the two sides fired at each other, though.
Right after the Pahalgam attack, India suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 agreement that had previously survived three wars – in 1965, 1971 and 1999 – unscathed. The treaty gives India access to the waters of the three eastern rivers of the Indus basin: The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan, in turn, gets the waters of the three western rivers: The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.
The river system is a vital lifeline for Pakistan, which relies on its waters. India, as the upper riparian state, has the ability – in theory at least – to restrict or stop the flow of the water into Pakistan. Islamabad described New Delhi’s decision to walk away from its obligations under the Indus Waters Treaty as an “act of war”.
In an incendiary remark at the peak of the tensions, Pakistani former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto said “either the water will flow, or their blood will,” seemingly referring to Indians.
Three days after the ceasefire was announced, India has still not recommitted itself to the pact. In his speech on Monday evening, Modi’s statement that “blood and water cannot flow together” signalled that New Delhi had not yet decided to return to the treaty.
New nuclear threshold?
Even as India and Pakistan ratcheted up their measures – first diplomatically, then militarily – against each other, the rest of the world was spooked by the prospect of what could have turned into a full-blown war between nuclear-armed neighbours.
Up until now, that reality of nuclear weapons has affected India’s decisions in terms of how it treats its tensions with Pakistan, said Clary, the former Pentagon official. “India’s goal is to punish Pakistan without risking nuclear danger,” he said.
But on Monday, Modi appeared to suggest that New Delhi was reassessing that approach. “India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail,” he said.
Modi’s comments pointed to a “fundamental shift that has occurred in relations between India and Pakistan”, Donthi, the International Crisis Group analyst, said. “Both sides are willing to take greater risks and explore the potential for escalation below the nuclear threshold. However, there is very little space there, effectively making the euphemism of the region being a nuclear flashpoint truer than ever.”
Armed group or Pakistani government? No difference to India
Modi’s comments on “nuclear blackmail” weren’t the only ones that marked a break from the past.
When India launched attacks against Pakistan on May 7, it emphasised that it was only targeting “terrorist” bases and not attacking Pakistani military installations. However, on Monday, Modi said that in future, “India will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.”
That position raises the danger of war, said experts.
“The conflation of terrorists and their (alleged) backers – namely, the military and the government – portends serious risks,” Donthi said. “It assumes that they are in lockstep. Such an assumption doesn’t take into account facts such as the seemingly successful ceasefire.”
India and Pakistan had signed a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in 2003 and had renewed it in 2021. Despite cross-border firing along the LoC, the ceasefire had largely held until last week.
With the threshold for a military conflict lowered, “the situation has become precarious,” Donthi said.
“A single militant attack is all it takes to plunge into war, leaving no room for diplomacy and raising no questions. Any power hostile to either or both sides can exploit this.”
Conflict Zones
Gaza’s hospitals cannot provide food to recovering patients | Israel-Palestine conflict News

Hospital patients in Gaza are under increasing threat as Israel’s blockade on food and other supplies entering the enclave enters its third month.
Palestinians across Gaza are struggling to feed themselves, and with hospitals unable to provide food, families must bring whatever they can find for their loved ones.
“Most, if not all, wounded patients have lost weight, especially in the past two months,” said Dr Khaled Alserr, a general surgeon at Nasser Hospital in the southern city of Khan Younis.
Nutritional supplements for intensive care unit patients are lacking, he said. “Our hands are tied when it comes to making the best choice for patients. Choices are limited.”
Aid groups say that malnutrition is on the rise across Gaza.
Thousands of children have been found with acute malnutrition in the past month, but adults are also not receiving proper nutrients, according to the United Nations. It estimates that 16,000 pregnant women and new mothers this year face acute malnutrition.
Since Israel’s blockade began on March 2, food sources have been dwindling.
Aid groups have stopped food distribution. Bakeries have closed. Charity kitchens handing out bowls of pasta or lentils remain the last lifeline for most of the population, but they are rapidly closing for lack of supplies, according to the UN.
Markets are empty of almost everything except canned goods and small amounts of vegetables, and prices have been rising.
Local production of vegetables has plummeted because Israeli forces have damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s farmlands, the UN says, and much of the rest is inaccessible inside newly declared military zones.
Israel says it imposed the blockade and resumed its military campaign in March to pressure Hamas to release its remaining captives and disarm.
Israeli officials have asserted that enough food entered Gaza during a two-month ceasefire earlier this year. Rights groups have disputed that and called the blockade a “starvation tactic” and a potential war crime.
Now, Israel plans to control aid distribution in Gaza, using private contractors to distribute supplies.
The UN and other aid groups have rejected the idea, saying it could restrict who is eligible to give and receive aid and could force large numbers of Palestinians to move, which would violate international law.
Those under care at hospitals, and their families who scrounge to feed them, would face further challenges under Israel’s proposal. Moving to reach aid could be out of the question.
Israel’s war on Gaza has killed at least 52,829 Palestinians and wounded 119,554, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry. The enclave’s Government Media Office updated the death toll to more than 61,700, saying thousands of people missing under the rubble are presumed dead.
An estimated 1,139 people were killed in Israel during the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023, and more than 200 were taken captive.
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