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Could India, Pakistan use nuclear weapons? Here’s what their doctrines say | India-Pakistan Tensions News

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Pakistan said it struck multiple Indian military bases in the early hours of Saturday, May 10, after claiming that India had launched missiles against three Pakistani bases, marking a sharp escalation in their already soaring tensions, as the neighbours edge closer to an all-out war.

Long-simmering hostilities, mostly over the disputed region of Kashmir, erupted into renewed fighting after the deadly April 22 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir that saw 25 tourists and a local guide killed in an armed group attack. India blamed Pakistan for the attack; Islamabad denied any role.

Since then, the nations have engaged in a series of tit-for-tat moves that began with diplomatic steps but have rapidly turned into aerial military confrontation.

As both sides escalate shelling and missile attacks and seem on the road to a full-scale battle, an unprecedented reality stares not just at the 1.6 billion people of India and Pakistan but at the world: An all-out war between them would be the first ever between two nuclear-armed nations.

“It would be stupid for either side to launch a nuclear attack on the other … It is way short of probable that nuclear weapons are used, but that does not mean it’s impossible,” Dan Smith, director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, told Al Jazeera.

So, how did we get here? What are the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan like? And when – according to them – might they use nuclear weapons?

How tensions have spiralled since April 22

India has long accused The Resistance Front (TRF) – the armed group that initially claimed credit for the Pahalgam attack, before then distancing itself from the killings – of being a proxy for the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based armed group that has repeatedly targeted India, including in the 2008 Mumbai attacks that left more than 160 people dead.

New Delhi blamed Islamabad for the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan denied any role.

India withdrew from a bilateral pact on water sharing, and both sides scaled back diplomatic missions and expelled each other’s citizens. Pakistan also threatened to walk out of other bilateral pacts, including the 1972 Simla Agreement that bound the neighbours to a ceasefire line in disputed Kashmir, known as the Line of Control (LoC).

But on May 7, India launched a wave of missile attacks against sites in Pakistan and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. It claimed it hit “terrorist infrastructure”, but Pakistan says at least 31 civilians, including two children, were killed.

On May 8, India launched drones into Pakistani airspace, reaching the country’s major cities. India claimed it was retaliating, and that Pakistan had fired missiles and drones at it. Then, for two nights in a row, cities in India and Indian-administered Kashmir reported explosions that New Delhi claimed were the result of attempted Pakistani attacks that were thwarted.

Pakistan denied sending missiles and drones into India on May 8 and May 9 – but that changed in the early hours of May 10, when Pakistan first claimed that India targeted three of its bases with missiles. Soon after, Pakistan claimed it struck at least seven Indian bases. India has not yet responded either to Pakistan’s claims that Indian bases were hit or to Islamabad’s allegation that New Delhi launched missiles at its military installations.

Interactive_India_Pakistan_Arms_Race_May7_2025

How many nuclear warheads do India and Pakistan have?

India first conducted nuclear tests in May 1974 before subsequent tests in May 1998, after which it declared itself a nuclear weapons state. Within days, Pakistan launched a series of six nuclear tests and officially became a nuclear-armed state, too.

Each side has since raced to build arms and nuclear stockpiles bigger than the other, a project that has cost them billions of dollars.

India is currently estimated to have more than 180 nuclear warheads. It has developed longer-range missiles and mobile land-based missiles capable of delivering them, and is working with Russia to build ship and submarine missiles, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Pakistan’s arsenal, meanwhile, consists of more than 170 warheads. The country enjoys technological support from its regional ally, China, and its stockpile includes primarily mobile short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, with enough range to hit just inside India.

A motorcyclist rides past shattered glasses of a restaurant outside the Rawalpindi cricket stadium after an alleged drone was shot down in Rawalpindi on May 8, 2025. India and Pakistan accused each other on May 8 of carrying out waves of drone attacks, as deadly confrontations between the nuclear-armed foes drew global calls for calm. Pakistan's army said it shot down 25 Indian drones, while New Delhi accused Islamabad of launching overnight raids with "drones and missiles", and claimed it destroyed an air defence system in Lahore. (Photo by Aamir QURESHI / AFP)
A motorcyclist rides past shattered windows of a restaurant outside the Rawalpindi cricket stadium after an alleged drone was shot down in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, on May 8, 2025 [Aamir Qureshi/ AFP]

What’s India’s nuclear policy?

India’s interest in nuclear power was initially sparked and expanded under its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who was eager to use it to boost energy generation. However, in recent decades, the country has solidified its nuclear power status to deter its neighbours, China and Pakistan, over territorial disputes.

New Delhi’s first and only nuclear doctrine was published in 2003 and has not been formally revised. The architect of that doctrine, the late strategic analyst K Subrahmanyam, was the father of India’s current foreign minister, S Jaishankar.

Only the prime minister, as head of the political council of the Nuclear Command Authority, can authorise a nuclear strike. India’s nuclear doctrine is built around four principles:

No First Use (NFU): This principle means that India will not be the first to launch nuclear attacks on its enemies. It will only retaliate with nuclear weapons if it is first hit in a nuclear attack. India’s doctrine says it can launch retaliation against attacks committed on Indian soil or if nuclear weapons are used against its forces on foreign territory. India also commits to not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.
Credible Minimum Deterrence: India’s nuclear posture is centred around deterrence – that is, its nuclear arsenal is meant primarily to discourage other countries from launching a nuclear attack on the country. India maintains that its nuclear arsenal is insurance against such attacks. It’s one of the reasons why New Delhi is not a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as it maintains that all countries uniformly disarm before it does the same.
Massive Retaliation: India’s retaliation to a first-strike from an aggressor will be calculated to inflict such destruction and damage that the enemy’s military capabilities will be annihilated.
Exceptions for biological or chemical weapons: As an exception to NFU, India will use nuclear weapons against any state that targets the country or its military forces abroad with biological or chemical weapons, according to the doctrine.

 

What is Pakistan’s nuclear policy?

Strategic Ambiguity: Pakistan has never officially released a comprehensive policy statement on its nuclear weapons use, giving it the flexibility to potentially deploy nuclear weapons at any stage of a conflict, as it has threatened to do in the past. Experts widely believe that from the outset, Islamabad’s non-transparency was strategic and meant to act as a deterrence to India’s superior conventional military strength, rather than to India’s nuclear power alone.
The Four Triggers: However, in 2001, Lieutenant General (Retd) Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, regarded as a pivotal strategist involved in Pakistan’s nuclear policy, and an adviser to the nuclear command agency, laid out four broad “red lines” or triggers that could result in a nuclear weapon deployment. They are:

Spatial threshold – Any loss of large parts of Pakistani territory could warrant a response. This also forms the root of its conflict with India.

Military threshold – Destruction or targeting of a large number of its air or land forces could be a trigger.

Economic threshold – Actions by aggressors that might have a choking effect on Pakistan’s economy.

Political threshold – Actions that lead to political destabilisation or large-scale internal disharmony.

However, Pakistan has never spelled out just how large the loss of territory of its armed forces needs to be for these triggers to be set off.

Has India’s nuclear posture changed?

Although India’s official doctrine has remained the same, Indian politicians have in recent years implied that a more ambiguous posture regarding the No First Use policy might be in the works, presumably to match Pakistan’s stance.

In 2016, India’s then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar questioned if India needed to continue binding itself to NFU. In 2019, the present Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that India had so far strictly adhered to the NFU policy, but that changing situations could affect that.

“What happens in the future depends on the circumstances,” Singh had said.

India adopting this strategy might be seen as proportional, but some experts note that strategic ambiguity is a double-edged sword.

“The lack of knowledge of an adversary’s red lines could lead to lines inadvertently being crossed, but it could also restrain a country from engaging in actions that may trigger a nuclear response,” expert Lora Saalman notes in a commentary for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Has Pakistan’s nuclear posture changed?

Pakistan has moved from an ambiguous policy of not spelling out a doctrine to a more vocal “No NFU” policy in recent years.

In May 2024, Kidwai, the nuclear command agency adviser, said during a seminar that Islamabad “does not have a No First Use policy”.

As significantly, Pakistan has, since 2011, developed a series of so-called tactical nuclear weapons. TNWs are short-range nuclear weapons designed for more contained strikes and are meant to be used on the battlefield against an opposing army without causing widespread destruction.

In 2015, then-Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry confirmed that TNWs could be used in a potential future conflict with India.

In reality, however, experts warn that these warheads, too, can have explosive yields of up to 300 kilotonnes, or 20 times that of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Not only could such explosions be disastrous, but some experts say that they might well affect Pakistan’s own border populations.



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Conflict Zones

Philippines election results: Who won, who lost and what’s next? | Elections News

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Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, detained at the International Criminal Court (ICC), is on course to win the mayoral election in his home Davao City, and five candidates backed by his family are leading the Senate race as midterm election results appear to show the Duterte political dynasty’s continued grip on power.

The results are a big boost for Vice President Sara Duterte, Rodrigo Duterte’s daughter, who faces impeachment by the Senate in July. A two-thirds majority is required to remove her from office and bar her from running in future elections, including the 2028 presidential one.

Twelve out of 24 Senate seats and all 317 seats in the House of Representatives were among the 18,320 elective positions up for grabs in the key election. Nearly 69 million people were registered to vote in the Asia Pacific country.

Who won the election?

With 97 percent of the votes reported, candidates backed by President Marcos Jr are on course to win six of the 12 seats in the Senate.

Duterte’s supporters, including staunch ally Christopher “Bong” Go are set to win five seats. One candidate who is winning a seat has been affiliated with both political families.

Rodrigo Duterte is set to win the mayoral seat in Davao after receiving more than 65 percent of the votes.

Duterte was the mayor of the southern city thrice, serving a total of 22 years. If he wins, it is likely that the role would be assumed by the city’s vice mayor, a position currently held by his son, Sebastian Duterte.

In the Philippines, candidates facing criminal charges, including those in detention, can run for office unless they are convicted.

What’s at stake?

While President Marcos Jr and Vice President Sara Duterte were not on the poll, their candidates were vying for positions from the Senate to municipal offices.

Sara Duterte is a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. Her political future can be decided by the 24-member Senate. She requires support of nine Senate members to avoid conviction.

The 12 elected Senators will form half of the jury in her impeachment trial, which is tentatively set for July. If found guilty, she will be removed from office and barred from contesting future elections.

She was impeached by the House of Representatives in February after being accused of crimes ranging from the misuse of public funds to plotting Marcos’s assassination.

Sara Duterte says the impeachment is part of a political vendetta as the two families battle for power.

The fate of hundreds of governors and thousands of seats for city mayor and municipal mayors were also decided in this election.

The official results will be out within a week.

What is the political rivalry between the Marcos and Duterte families?

Sara Duterte is the daughter of former President Duterte, who was arrested and flown to the ICC at The Hague on March 11 by the Marcos Jr administration.

The elder Duterte was accused of “crimes against humanity” for the estimated deaths of 30,000 people during his tenures as mayor and president.

More than 7,000 people were killed during anti-drug operations while he was in power between 2016 and 2022, according to police records. Human rights advocates suggest the actual death toll was higher.

Marcos Jr allied with the Duterte family, which enjoyed popularity, during his successful 2022 presidential campaign, with Sara Duterte as his running mate. But the ties soon soured over policy differences and Marcos’s rejection of the war on drugs launched by Sara Duterte’s father, Rodrigo Duterte.

Finally, the alliance crumbled due to faltering support for Marcos Jr among supporters of the Duterte family after the arrest of Apollo Quiboloy, who was the spiritual adviser of former President Duterte. Quibology, an influential pastor, was charged with sex trafficking.

The arrest of Rodrigo Duterte on a warrant issued by the ICC further inflamed tension between the two political dynasties.

Until Rodrigo Duterte’s arrest, Marcos Jr repeatedly rejected the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction over his country, deeming the ICC “a threat” to the country’s sovereignty. Marcos Jr had held he would not assist the ICC in the elder Duterte’s arrest.

“Let me say this for the 100th time. I do not recognise the jurisdiction of ICC in the Philippines. The Philippine government will not lift a finger to help any investigation that the ICC conducts,” Marcos Jr said in early 2024.

In 2019, (Rodrigo) Duterte had removed the Philippines from the ICC, meaning the country was not required to detain someone with an ICC warrant against their name.

The political tensions between the Duterte family and Marcos Jr reached a crescendo when the younger Duterte was impeached this February. She remains VP, but a Senate trial hangs like the sword of Damocles over her head.



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‘No guardrails’: How India-Pakistan combat obliterated old red lines | India-Pakistan Tensions News

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New Delhi, India – Guns have fallen silent for now along the tense India-Pakistan frontier, after a ceasefire that appears to have held for three nights.

On May 7, India launched predawn attacks on what it called multiple “terror sites” across Pakistan to avenge the April 22 killing of 26 men, almost all of them tourists, in Indian-administered Kashmir’s resort town of Pahalgam. New Delhi accused Islamabad of backing the gunmen. Pakistan denied its involvement.

India’s aerial assault kick-started four days of heightened tension, as both neighbours fired missiles and drones at each other’s military installations in a rapidly escalating cycle that brought them to the brink of full-scale war.

Both sides have claimed to have decisively damaged, even destroyed, the other’s key strategic facilities, even though early evidence suggests more limited damage to military bases in both India and Pakistan.

Yet even as India and Pakistan arrived at a ceasefire that United States President Donald Trump insists his administration brokered, experts say something has indeed been decimated, potentially beyond repair: Old red lines that had defined the tense relationship between the South Asian neighbours.

“India and Pakistan have entered a phase of ‘armed coexistence’ with little room for diplomacy and a narrow margin for error, despite having a live and sensitive border,” Praveen Donthi, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group in New Delhi, told Al Jazeera.

“This situation does not bode well for either country or the region, because even accidental triggers could escalate into a war-like situation with no guardrails in place.”

India-Pakistan dispute: Who settles it?

The seeds of the India-Pakistan conflict were sown when their independence from British rule in 1947 was accompanied by a partition of the Indian subcontinent to create Pakistan.

Since then, the two neighbours have fought four wars, three of them over Kashmir, a region they both control partially along with China, which governs two thin slices in the north. India claims all of Kashmir, while Pakistan claims all parts other than the ones governed by China, its ally.

After their 1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan signed what is known as the Simla Agreement, which said “the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.”

While Pakistan has often cited United Nations resolutions to argue for international involvement in the resolution of the Kashmir dispute, India has cited the Simla Agreement for more than half a century to insist that any negotiations between the countries be strictly bilateral.

To be sure, the US has since intervened to calm tensions between India and Pakistan: In 1999, for instance, President Bill Clinton pressured Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw troops from the icy heights of Indian-controlled Kargil, where they had entered. However, Washington publicly played coy about its role, allowing India to insist that the US had only helped with crisis management, not any dispute resolution mediation.

That changed on Saturday, when US President Donald Trump upstaged New Delhi and Islamabad to announce a “full and immediate” India-Pakistan ceasefire hours before the governments of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi or his Pakistani counterpart Shehbaz Sharif confirmed the development.

The next day, Trump went further. “I will work with you, both to see if, after a ‘thousand years,’ a solution can be arrived at concerning Kashmir,” he posted on his Truth Social platform.

And on Monday, merely 30 minutes before Modi was scheduled for his first address since India launched attacks in Pakistan, Trump told reporters at the White House that his administration had leveraged trade to reach a ceasefire. “Let’s stop [the fighting]. If you stop it, we’ll do a trade. If you don’t stop it, we’re not going to do any trade,” Trump said. “And all of a sudden they said, ‘I think we’re going to stop.’ For a lot of reasons, but trade is a big one.”

Such US mediation, were it to happen, would shatter India’s longstanding red line against mediation by other countries, say experts.

“India has consistently sought to avoid third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute even as it has occasionally welcomed third-party help in crisis management,” Christopher Clary, a former Pentagon official and a non-resident fellow at the Washington, DC-based Stimson Center, told Al Jazeera.

When he spoke, Modi largely stuck to traditional positions he has taken after previous bouts of tension with Pakistan. He said “terror and talks cannot happen together,” and “water and blood cannot flow together,” a reference to the Indus Waters Treaty for sharing water between India and Pakistan, which New Delhi walked out of after the Pahalgam attack.

Unlike Pakistan PM Sharif, who expressed gratitude to Trump for brokering a ceasefire, Modi claimed that India had “only paused” its military action – noting the decision was taken bilaterally. He did not mention Trump or his administration.

Regardless, “the spectre of international intervention” in Kashmir has been resurrected, said Sumantra Bose, political scientist and the author of the 2021 book Kashmir at the Crossroads. He said India’s furious barrage of missiles and drones at Pakistan in response to the Pahalgam killings “catered to domestic jingoism but naturally roused global alarm”.

India might, however, be helped in avoiding actual US intervention in Kashmir by the immediacy of the Trump administration’s other foreign policy goals, like the conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine, “that will divert already overburdened [American] policymakers to other tasks”, said Clary.

Unprecedented targets

According to Bose, India and Pakistan crossed not just red lines, “but a Rubicon by attacking numerous high-population targets in cities and towns” last week.

India, in its most expansive offensive against Pakistan outside full-blown wars, said it hit “terrorist infrastructure” on May 7 as part of what it called Operation Sindoor. That was a reference to the vermillion that married Hindu women apply to their forehead, and an allusion to the manner in which the Pahalgam attack appears to have unfolded: Multiple witness accounts suggest the attackers segregated the men, then picked and hit non-Muslims.

Modi claimed, in his Monday statement, that the Indian attacks had killed more than 100 “terrorists”. Pakistan has insisted that only 31 civilians – including two children – were killed in the May attacks.

Yet both sides agree that the Indian missiles struck not just two cities – Muzaffarrabad and Kotli – in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, but also four cities in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the county’s economic heart and home to 60 percent of its population. The targets were Bahawalpur, Muridke, Shakar Garh and a village near Sialkot. This was the first time that India had struck Punjab since the 1971 war.

As tensions spiked, India accused Pakistan of unleashing a swarm of drones towards it – a charge Islamabad denied. Then India launched a wave of drones that reached Pakistan’s biggest population centres, including its two biggest cities, Karachi and Lahore. In the early hours of May 10, India and Pakistan fired missiles at each other’s military bases across multiple provinces – far beyond disputed Kashmir – even hitting a few.

Pakistan, which called its campaign Operation Bunyan Marsoos (a structure made of lead, in Arabic), targeted Indian air force bases and missile storage facilities in Drangyari, Udhampur, Uri and Nagrota (all in Indian-administered Kashmir), as well as in Pathankot, Beas and Adampur in Indian Punjab and Bhuj in Gujarat, Modi’s home state. Indian armed forces said that while they shot down most incoming missiles and drones, four air force bases suffered “limited damage”.

“We don’t know what the quantum [of Indian losses] are, but clearly Pakistan has demonstrated capability to impose costs on India even as we try to impose costs on them,” Indian military historian and strategic analyst Srinath Raghavan told Al Jazeera.

“Regarding red lines, another thing Pakistan sought to demonstrate was that they could keep this [the fighting] going till they had hit Indian military installations in retaliation.”

Meanwhile, India too targeted the Nur Khan airbase near Rawalpindi, Murid airbase in Chakwal and the Rafiqui airbase in Shorkot.

“India has shown that it is willing and capable of carrying out more strikes across the border, whether it’s a terrorist or even military infrastructure in Pakistan,” Raghavan said. India’s response went far beyond what happened in 2019, when Indian jets bombed what they described as a “terrorist camp” in Balakot, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, after a suicide bomber killed more than 40 Indian paramilitary soldiers.

Now, the 2025 attacks will serve as the new baseline for India, experts said.

“India would respond [in the future] on a similar scale, perhaps even a little bit more. Given the way both Balakot and the current crisis have played out, that should be the expectation,” said Raghavan.

Other weapons: Water to peace pacts

It isn’t just missiles and drones that the two sides fired at each other, though.

Right after the Pahalgam attack, India suspended its participation in the Indus Waters Treaty, a 1960 agreement that had previously survived three wars – in 1965, 1971 and 1999 – unscathed. The treaty gives India access to the waters of the three eastern rivers of the Indus basin: The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan, in turn, gets the waters of the three western rivers: The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

The river system is a vital lifeline for Pakistan, which relies on its waters. India, as the upper riparian state, has the ability – in theory at least – to restrict or stop the flow of the water into Pakistan. Islamabad described New Delhi’s decision to walk away from its obligations under the Indus Waters Treaty as an “act of war”.

In an incendiary remark at the peak of the tensions, Pakistani former Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto said “either the water will flow, or their blood will,” seemingly referring to Indians.

Three days after the ceasefire was announced, India has still not recommitted itself to the pact. In his speech on Monday evening, Modi’s statement that “blood and water cannot flow together” signalled that New Delhi had not yet decided to return to the treaty.

New nuclear threshold?

Even as India and Pakistan ratcheted up their measures – first diplomatically, then militarily – against each other, the rest of the world was spooked by the prospect of what could have turned into a full-blown war between nuclear-armed neighbours.

Up until now, that reality of nuclear weapons has affected India’s decisions in terms of how it treats its tensions with Pakistan, said Clary, the former Pentagon official. “India’s goal is to punish Pakistan without risking nuclear danger,” he said.

But on Monday, Modi appeared to suggest that New Delhi was reassessing that approach. “India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail. India will strike precisely and decisively at the terrorist hideouts developing under the cover of nuclear blackmail,” he said.

Modi’s comments pointed to a “fundamental shift that has occurred in relations between India and Pakistan”, Donthi, the International Crisis Group analyst, said. “Both sides are willing to take greater risks and explore the potential for escalation below the nuclear threshold. However, there is very little space there, effectively making the euphemism of the region being a nuclear flashpoint truer than ever.”

Armed group or Pakistani government? No difference to India

Modi’s comments on “nuclear blackmail” weren’t the only ones that marked a break from the past.

When India launched attacks against Pakistan on May 7, it emphasised that it was only targeting “terrorist” bases and not attacking Pakistani military installations. However, on Monday, Modi said that in future, “India will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.”

That position raises the danger of war, said experts.

“The conflation of terrorists and their (alleged) backers – namely, the military and the government – portends serious risks,” Donthi said. “It assumes that they are in lockstep. Such an assumption doesn’t take into account facts such as the seemingly successful ceasefire.”

India and Pakistan had signed a ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) in 2003 and had renewed it in 2021. Despite cross-border firing along the LoC, the ceasefire had largely held until last week.

With the threshold for a military conflict lowered, “the situation has become precarious,” Donthi said.

“A single militant attack is all it takes to plunge into war, leaving no room for diplomacy and raising no questions. Any power hostile to either or both sides can exploit this.”



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Gaza’s hospitals cannot provide food to recovering patients | Israel-Palestine conflict News

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Hospital patients in Gaza are under increasing threat as Israel’s blockade on food and other supplies entering the enclave enters its third month.

Palestinians across Gaza are struggling to feed themselves, and with hospitals unable to provide food, families must bring whatever they can find for their loved ones.

“Most, if not all, wounded patients have lost weight, especially in the past two months,” said Dr Khaled Alserr, a general surgeon at Nasser Hospital in the southern city of Khan Younis.

Nutritional supplements for intensive care unit patients are lacking, he said. “Our hands are tied when it comes to making the best choice for patients. Choices are limited.”

Aid groups say that malnutrition is on the rise across Gaza.

Thousands of children have been found with acute malnutrition in the past month, but adults are also not receiving proper nutrients, according to the United Nations. It estimates that 16,000 pregnant women and new mothers this year face acute malnutrition.

Since Israel’s blockade began on March 2, food sources have been dwindling.

Aid groups have stopped food distribution. Bakeries have closed. Charity kitchens handing out bowls of pasta or lentils remain the last lifeline for most of the population, but they are rapidly closing for lack of supplies, according to the UN.

Markets are empty of almost everything except canned goods and small amounts of vegetables, and prices have been rising.

Local production of vegetables has plummeted because Israeli forces have damaged 80 percent of Gaza’s farmlands, the UN says, and much of the rest is inaccessible inside newly declared military zones.

Israel says it imposed the blockade and resumed its military campaign in March to pressure Hamas to release its remaining captives and disarm.

Israeli officials have asserted that enough food entered Gaza during a two-month ceasefire earlier this year. Rights groups have disputed that and called the blockade a “starvation tactic” and a potential war crime.

Now, Israel plans to control aid distribution in Gaza, using private contractors to distribute supplies.

The UN and other aid groups have rejected the idea, saying it could restrict who is eligible to give and receive aid and could force large numbers of Palestinians to move, which would violate international law.

Those under care at hospitals, and their families who scrounge to feed them, would face further challenges under Israel’s proposal. Moving to reach aid could be out of the question.

Israel’s war on Gaza has killed at least 52,829 Palestinians and wounded 119,554, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry. The enclave’s Government Media Office updated the death toll to more than 61,700, saying thousands of people missing under the rubble are presumed dead.

An estimated 1,139 people were killed in Israel during the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023, and more than 200 were taken captive.



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