Middle East
Analysis: Call to disband PKK reshapes Turkiye, Syria power dynamics | Syria’s War News
The consequences of the call by the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan, for the group to disband are still reverberating – not just in Turkiye but also in the wider region.
Shifting alliances in Syria – exemplified by the recent agreement between the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian government – confirm that Ocalan’s message is not isolated or purely domestic but offers a crucial opportunity that could redefine everything from Turkiye’s security policies to the future positioning of Kurdish actors, shaping the next phase of regional power dynamics.
Ocalan, in a statement delivered from a Turkish prison in late February, called on the PKK to “convene your congress and make a decision. All groups must lay down their weapons, and the PKK should dissolve itself.”
The PKK leadership – from its longstanding command centre in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains – responded to Ocalan’s call by declaring a unilateral ceasefire with final disbandment as well as decisions on disarmament and other matters delayed until the congress can be held in a month or two. Turkiye remains firm in its demand that all PKK-affiliated groups, including its Syrian offshoots, must disband unconditionally.
The PKK’s decades-long conflict with Turkiye has killed more than 40,000 people. Ocalan, in addition to being the leader of the movement ideologically, also led the group’s armed rebellion until his capture in 1999. The PKK is considered a terrorist organisation by Turkiye, the United States and the European Union.
While Ocalan has advocated for ceasefires in the past, this is the first time he has called for the PKK to cease to exist, the reason for this likely being linked to shifts in Kurdish political movements, Turkish state strategy and broader regional realignments, especially the evolving dynamics in Syria.
Removing the Kurdish ‘fear factor’
The diminishing strategic value of armed struggle has coincided with the rise of Kurdish political actors, weakening the PKK’s role as a “fear factor” in Turkish politics.
Once instrumental in mobilising nationalist votes for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the PKK’s influence is fading as pro-Kurdish politics gain traction.
The Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) broke new ground in June 2015 by surpassing the 10 percent electoral threshold required to secure parliamentary representation – an achievement that pro-Kurdish parties had previously managed only by running independent candidates.
Today, the party now known as the Peoples’ Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) plays a pivotal role in elections as Kurdish votes shape Turkiye’s political landscape.
Against this backdrop, Ocalan’s call for the PKK’s disbandment is an effort to expand the space for Kurdish political representation within the democratic system.
Kurdish political mobilisation through political parties has become more powerful and influential than armed struggle.
The growth has not been unimpeded as state-imposed restrictions have continued.
For example, Selahattin Demirtas, the former leader of the HDP and a former presidential candidate, remains imprisoned, and Kurdish politicians and activists accused by the government of being close to the PKK face harsh sentences under “anti-terror” laws.
After the 2024 municipal elections, the government once again appointed trustees in some Kurdish-majority municipalities, preventing elected mayors from the DEM party from taking office.
These restrictions, however, may begin to ease with the gradual normalisation of pro-Kurdish politics, which could emerge as a result of the removal of the “terrorist” label from the broader movement and the construction of a new narrative that positions pro-Kurdish representatives as recognised political actors.
Turkiye’s stake
For the AK Party, consolidating electoral support requires a delicate balance between addressing Kurdish demands – and gaining those votes – and maintaining Turkish nationalist backing.
Had this initiative to talk to the PKK been driven solely by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan without the involvement of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli, who had long opposed any solution other than a military one, nationalist opposition to it would have been far more pronounced.
By having Bahceli invite Ocalan to address parliament and advocate for the “right to hope” – a measure supporting the release of individuals, including Ocalan, who have served 25 years – and engage in dialogue with DEM figures he had previously labelled as “terrorists”, the government has managed to pre-emptively contain hardline resistance, making the transition more politically viable.
A successful peace process could help rekindle support for the AK Party among Kurdish voters who had turned away from the party since the collapse of the Turkiye-PKK peace process in 2015 and the government’s turn towards Turkish nationalism – as well as attract a new generation of Kurdish voters.
On the other hand, opposition within Turkiye to such a development remains a wild card. Hardline factions within the government and in nationalist circles are likely to resist any perceived concessions to pro-Kurdish political actors.
Externally, the “Kurdish issue” has long been an obstacle in Turkiye’s foreign relations, particularly with Western allies and the EU, for which Turkiye remains a candidate country.
Concerns over rights and liberties, the undermining of Kurdish rights and political representation, the imprisonment of Kurdish politicians and Western support for Kurdish groups fighting ISIL (ISIS) in Syria have all contributed to tensions in Turkiye’s foreign relations.
By proactively managing this transition, Ankara could frame itself as the architect of Kurdish political normalisation, strengthening its stance both regionally and internationally.
Meanwhile, the reality that neither Turkiye nor the PKK can achieve absolute victory militarily has become increasingly clear. The decline in active conflict within Turkiye has also reshaped public perception.
Turkiye’s military operations in Syria – Euphrates Shield (2016-2017), Olive Branch (2018) and Peace Spring (2019) – shifted the primary battleground from Turkiye’s border areas into northern Syria, where clashes between the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and Syrian Kurdish forces continue.
This strategy has not only established Turkish-controlled zones but also altered the conflict’s geography, reducing direct threats to Turkiye while intensifying power struggles in Syrian areas like Afrin, Ras al-Ain, and Tal Abyad.
The PKK’s disbandment is not a done deal, however, and opposition parties, particularly the Republican People’s Party (CHP), which is desperately eager to end the AK Party’s 23-year rule, remain hesitant to support the initiative.
While the CHP officially endorses a peaceful resolution to the “Kurdish issue”, it is sceptical of a process led by Erdogan’s government, not knowing what may be unfolding in closed-door negotiations.
Moreover, the CHP is cautious about lending legitimacy to a process that could strengthen the AK Party’s appeal among Kurdish voters, particularly with elections in the future.
For now, it has adopted a wait-and-see stance because the only thing known is the intent of the PKK to dissolve rather than its actual mechanisms.
![Abdullah Ocalan, the jailed leader of the outlawed Kurdish militant group PKK, is seen with politicians and lawmakers of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) Ahmet Turk, Pervin Buldan, Sirri Sureyya Onder, Tulay Hatimogullari, Tuncer Bakirhan, Cengiz Cicek and Faik Ozgur Erol, in Imrali Island prison, in Marmara Sea, in Turkey, February 27, 2025. [Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party Handout via Reuters]](https://www.aljazeera.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/2025-02-27T151559Z_1225325094_RC203DAC3IJM_RTRMADP_3_TURKEY-KURDS-OCALAN_cropped-1740682662.jpg?w=770&resize=770%2C433)
The Syrian equation
Ocalan’s appeal reflects a broader shift as nonstate armed groups across the region face growing pressure to adapt for survival and legitimacy.
In northern Syria, a strategic priority for the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing – the People’s Defence Units (YPG), which is the core force in the US-backed SDF – is preserving their territorial and political position.
Set up in 2003 as a PKK offshoot, the PYD came into its own in northern Syria and has been targeted in military offensives by Ankara and Ankara-supported groups in Syria, such as the SNA.
Ocalan may have been motivated by a hope that a disbanded PKK would result in fewer direct confrontations between Turkiye and the PYD, possibly helping the PYD keep a level of self-administration and rights within the new Syrian state and constitution.
An important step in this direction came on Monday when the SDF signed an agreement in Damascus with interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa for their forces to merge with the Syrian army and cooperate on several economic, social and political fronts.
Whether this will be enough for Turkiye to relent in its pursuit of the SDF depends on the details of the agreement and its implementation. So far, the agreement has been supported by Erdogan, who emphasised that the full implementation of the agreement would serve Syria’s security and stability and benefit all Syrians.
Public statements by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan previously showed that Turkiye aims to shape the terms of the PYD’s acceptance within a reconfigured Syrian framework by calling for the removal of foreign PKK elements, dismantling the YPG’s military leadership and integrating the PYD into the Syrian state without its armed wings or territorial ambitions.
What’s likely to follow?
A resolution of the “Kurdish issue” could enhance Turkiye’s diplomatic leverage, especially with European and American actors critical of its policies against Kurds domestically and in neighbouring states.
A sustainable process may also ease tensions with Iraq and Syria, where Turkiye’s operations against Kurdish groups have caused friction. This would further strengthen security and economic cooperation with Baghdad and the new government in Damascus.
While legislative steps will play a crucial role in facilitating this transition, a well-defined roadmap with legal, political and social adjustments is necessary.
The focus will soon shift to the future of PKK fighters. According to intensifying public debate in Turkiye, several potential pathways exist.
Some may receive legal amnesty and reintegration support. Others may be absorbed into legitimate Kurdish political structures, and some senior leaders may be relocated to third countries with their current base in Iraq being a likely destination.
Ultimately, the sustainability of this process will be determined by meaningful democratic reforms, expanding cultural and political rights, safeguarding civil liberties and paving the way for a new democratic constitutional framework as a foundation of a more inclusive political order.
However, based on declarations by Turkiye’s state actors, the current vision does not include any of these major reforms. How the PKK’s dissolution could occur without these fundamental changes remains an open question. For its fighters, a legal framework will be a necessity for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.
While some figures within the DEM advocate for a fast-tracked process to consolidate their political standing and deliver gains for their constituents, AK Party politicians could be motivated by electoral concerns, seeking a resolution that neutralises tensions without making deep structural concessions.
The PKK’s ceasefire is a notable first step, but its long-term viability depends on how to institutionalise it, which a purely tactical or rushed settlement could not provide.
At the same time, it is crucial to recognise that no peace process can be built on uncompromising demands or an idealised, frictionless roadmap.
Sustainable peace requires pragmatic solutions, gradual steps, and an acceptance that negotiations will involve setbacks, competing interests and the necessity of mutual concessions.
Middle East
Palestinian journalist among two killed in Israeli attack on Gaza hospital | Israel-Palestine conflict News
Hassan Eslaih has been killed in Nasser Hospital during treatment for injuries sustained in the previous Israeli attack.
Israel’s army has admitted to carrying out “a targeted attack” on the Nasser Medical Complex in the city of Khan Younis in southern Gaza, killing two people, including Palestinian journalist Hassan Eslaih.
Gaza’s Government Media Office on Tuesday confirmed the killing of Eslaih, who was receiving treatment at the hospital’s burn unit for severe injuries sustained during an April 7 Israeli strike on a media tent located next to the hospital.
The AFP news agency footage from Nasser Hospital after Tuesday’s strike showed smoke rising from the facility as rescuers searched through the rubble by the light of torches.
A hospital worker who gave his name as Abu Ghali said the Israeli bombardment “does not differentiate between civilians and military targets”.
“This is a civilian hospital that receives injured people around the clock,” he told AFP.
Eslaih was the director of the Alam24 News Agency and a freelancer who contributed to international news organisations, including photos of the Hamas-led October 7 attack.
Israel has claimed Eslaih was a Hamas fighter who participated in the October 7 attack, an allegation he vehemently denied.
Dozens of journalists killed
At least 178 journalists and media workers have been killed in Palestine, Israel, and Lebanon since the war began, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists. Gaza’s Government Media Office put the death toll at 215.
Israel’s military said in a post on Telegram that the strike targeted a Hamas “command and control complex” at the hospital – the largest in southern Gaza – without providing further evidence.
“The compound was used by the terrorists to plan and execute terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and [military] troops,” the post said, in what appeared to be a reference to Eslaih and Hamas.
Gaza’s Health Ministry on Tuesday condemned “the repeated targeting of hospitals and the pursuit and killing of wounded patients inside treatment rooms”, saying it “confirms Israel’s deliberate intent to inflict greater damage to the healthcare system”.
Hospitals in Gaza have been a frequent target of Israeli attacks since the war began in October 2023, although attacking health facilities, medical personnel and patients is illegal under the 1949 Geneva Convention.
According to officials in Gaza, Israel has bombed and burned at least 36 hospitals across the enclave since the war erupted.
Middle East
Campaigners take UK to court over export of F-35 components to Israel | Israel-Palestine conflict News
The United Kingdom’s government faces a High Court challenge over the export of F-35 jet components used by Israel.
Co-claimants Al-Haq, a Palestinian rights organisation, and the Global Legal Action Network (GLAN) are behind the case.
“We’re going to court to try to force the government to stop supplying F-35 components to Israel,” Jennine Walker, a lawyer with GLAN and the legal firm Bindmans, representing Al-Haq, told Al Jazeera.
The four-day case is set to begin on Tuesday, as Israel’s onslaught in Gaza continues with the aid of F-35 jets, having already killed more than 61,700 people.
Here’s what you need to know:
What’s happening?
In September 2024, the UK suspended about 30 out of 350 arms export licences to Israel following a review that found there was “a clear risk certain military exports to Israel might be used in violations of international humanitarian law”, according to the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
But it carved out an exception for F-35 jet components, citing the F-35 global programme’s importance to international security. The parts, however, would not be sent directly to Israel, the government said.
Al-Haq and GLAN argue that the government is breaking domestic and international law through a loophole by allowing the parts to be supplied to Israel via the global spares pool and F-35 partner countries, “despite the [International Court of Justice] finding that there is plausible risk of genocide being committed against Palestinians in Gaza”.
The UK reportedly provides about 15 percent of the components in the F-35 fighter jets used by Israel.
The case has taken on new significance after a report last week by the Palestinian Youth Movement, Progressives International and Workers for a Free Palestine suggested F-35 parts are still being sent directly to Israel as of March 2025.
“Despite the September 2024 suspension of direct shipments of F-35 components from the UK to Israel, the data suggest such shipments are ongoing as of March 2025”, the report said, citing Israeli tax authority data.
From Tuesday until Friday, High Court judges will examine whether the government’s decision to suspend some but not all arms licences for export to Israel was legally correct.
Al Jazeera understands the judicial review will focus on the carve-out for F-35 jet parts. The campaigners have said they aim to ensure the UK government “urgently suspends all arms exports to Israel”, while accusing the UK of “complicity” in Israel’s genocide against Palestinians.
What will the campaigners argue?
Co-claimants Al-Haq and GLAN applied for a judicial review into arms export licences to Israel in December 2023, citing violations carried out by Israel against Palestinians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank.
They say F-35 jets have plausibly been involved in war crimes.
“We know Israel is using the F-35 jets to bomb civilians. For example [in] the attack on March 18 which broke the ceasefire, and this wouldn’t be possible without the UK’s help,” Walker said.
“Hundreds of civilians died,” Walker said, referring to one of the deadliest days across Gaza when Israeli assaults killed more than 400 people. “We know every F-35 jet has some British parts.”
What’s the UK’s position?
In a statement sent to Al Jazeera, a spokesperson with the UK’s Foreign Office said, “This government has suspended relevant licences for the [Israeli army] that might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza.”
The spokesperson added that of the remaining licences for Israel, the “vast majority” are not for the Israeli army but for “civilian purposes or re-export, and therefore are not used in the war in Gaza”.
The spokesperson reiterated the government’s position that the F-35 programme exemption was “due to its strategic role in NATO and wider implications for international peace and security”, adding that “any suggestion that the UK is licensing other weapons for use by Israel in the war in Gaza is misleading”.
Which other groups are involved in the case?
Oxfam, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are assisting the court by submitting written evidence.
Oxfam’s intervention is based on its documentation of the destruction caused by Israeli fire on water sanitation and health facilities.
Akshaya Kumar, the director of crisis advocacy at Human Rights Watch, raised the idea of criminal responsibility, referencing the Yugoslavia war crimes tribunal.
“If you are a supplier, you are aiding and abetting the continued assault, the continued air strikes. You are part of that criminal responsibility,” she said.
Elizabeth Rghebi, the MENA advocacy director at Amnesty International USA, argued that several states have either been unwilling to observe international legal obligations or have claimed that the structure of the F-35 programme makes it impossible to apply arms controls to the end-user, “which would make the entire programme incompatible with international law”.
What is the scale of damage from Israeli air strikes in Gaza?
Israel’s latest military assault on Gaza began shortly after October 7, 2023, when Hamas, the group that governs the Strip, led an incursion into southern Israel, during which 1,139 people were killed and more than 200 were taken captive.
Israel has failed to achieve its stated aim of crushing Hamas, while its aerial bombardment from jets, including the F-35, has decimated civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, universities, libraries, mosques and churches.
Emeritus professor Paul Rogers from the University of Bradford said, “In terms of tonnage dropped, most modern wars have had very high levels of tonnage used. Gaza is probably one of the worst. If you go back to the Second World War – [there was] the carpet bombing of German cities, the firebombing of Japanese cities, for that matter, and, on a smaller scale, the bombing Britain experienced during the second and third years of the war.”
He added: “So, it’s not exceptional in that sense, but the concentration of so much firepower in a very small area is very unusual. It bears comparison with some of the worst examples of modern warfare and their impact on civilians.”
The World Health Organization (WHO) has documented the woes inflicted on Gaza’s healthcare sector, including the systematic destruction of hospitals, withholding of medical supplies and the detention of doctors.
“Airstrikes and a lack of medical supplies, food, water and fuel have virtually depleted an already under-resourced health system,” the WHO said.
It added that 90 percent of housing units in Gaza have been destroyed or damaged. A similar percentage of school buildings require complete reconstruction or major rehabilitation.
On May 4, Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a barrage of suicide drones at Port Sudan, the army’s de facto wartime capital on the Red Sea.
The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) accused foreign actors of supporting the RSF’s attacks and even threatened to sever ties with one of its biggest trading partners.
The RSF surprised many with the strikes. It had used drones before, but never hit targets as far away as Port Sudan, which used to be a haven, until last week.
“The strikes … led to a huge displacement from the city. Many people left Port Sudan,” Aza Aera, a local relief worker, told Al Jazeera. “If the aggression continues … I think I’ll leave like everyone else.”
A drone war
When a civil war erupted between the SAF and RSF in April 2023, the army had aerial supremacy due to its fleet of warplanes and drones.
Yet the RSF is closing the gap with an arsenal of suicide drones, which it used on Port Sudan for six consecutive days, hitting an army base, a civilian airport, several hotels, and a fuel depot, which caused a massive blast.
“Sudan had already entered the phase of drone warfare over the last … few months at least,” said Suliman Baldo, the founder of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker think tank.
The army largely relies on the relatively affordable Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones, reportedly receiving $120m worth of them since late 2023.
Bayraktars can travel long distances with a large payload, and the army says they helped it regain swaths of territory from the RSF in eastern and central Sudan between September 2024 and March 2025, including the capital Khartoum.
Despite losing significant ground, the RSF then stepped up its aggression against the SAF with Chinese-made drones, according to a recent report by Amnesty International.
The human rights group, Sudan’s de facto military government and other monitors all accuse the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of purchasing these drones – and other weapons – and supplying them to the RSF.
The UAE has denied the accusations as “baseless”.
“The UAE strongly rejects the suggestion that it is supplying weapons to any party involved in the ongoing conflict in Sudan,” said Salem Aljaberi, a spokesperson for the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement on X.
Regardless, the increasing use of drones by both sides marks an escalation and risks exacerbating an already catastrophic situation for civilians, according to experts and human rights monitors.
Bold announcement
On May 6, the army-backed authorities in Port Sudan announced the severing of all ties with the UAE after accusing it of being behind the attacks.
That announcement was not well thought-out, according to Baldo.
Sudan’s army could lose tens of millions of dollars in gold revenue, as well as access to vital banking operations, he told Al Jazeera.
A UAE-backed company, Emiral Resources, owns a majority of shares in Sudan’s largest gold mine, the Kush mine.
Kush is administered by Sudan’s army, which likely sells tens of millions of dollars worth of gold to the UAE.
According to the Central Bank of Sudan, about 97 percent of gold exports from army-controlled areas went to the UAE in 2023.
Kush exported at least one tonne of gold in 2024, although it is unclear how much higher the number is for production.
Furthermore, UAE banks own a majority share in the Bank of Khartoum, whose digital platform, Bankak, facilitates money transfers for millions of displaced Sudanese and public institutions.
The UAE state also owns El Nilein Bank, which manages and approves international transactions on behalf of Port Sudan, according to a report that Baldo co-authored in March for the Chatham House think tank.
“This was a rushed decision [to cut ties with the UAE] that will have serious consequences … due to the UAE’s control over [Sudan’s] national economy,” Baldo told Al Jazeera.
Major escalation?
Sudan’s army has not clarified how and when it will sever ties with the UAE.
On May 6, SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan vowed in a video to “defeat the militia (RSF) and those who help them”.
Al Jazeera sent written questions to army spokesperson Nabil Abdullah, asking if Port Sudan will implement the announced suspension.
No reply was received by time of publication.
For its part, the UAE’s Foreign Ministry told Al Jazeera in an email that it will not retaliate against Port Sudan.
“The statement issued by the so-called ‘Security and Defence Council’ will not affect the deep-rooted and enduring ties between the UAE and the Republic of the Sudan, and their peoples,” the emailed statement said.
Meanwhile, experts and observers believe the war in Sudan is trending towards a major escalation.
The army’s regional backers could respond to the RSF’s increased use of drones by doubling down on their support for the army, warned Alan Boswell, a Sudan expert for the International Crisis Group.
“The obvious risk [from the attacks on Port Sudan] is that it brings other [regional powers] into deeper involvement on the army’s side,” he told Al Jazeera.
“We could see an escalating war with greater and greater firepower, and nothing would be left of Sudan’s infrastructure by the end of it.”
