Sudan: Idris’s Gradual Government Formation Sparks Deep Divisions Within the Army-Aligned Camp

Amid highly complex political and military circumstances, the Prime Minister appointed by the army in Port Sudan, Kamil Idris Al-Tayyib, has begun gradually announcing the members of his new government. This move has sparked growing tension between him and the leaders of armed movements that signed the Juba Peace Agreement.

On June 24, Idris appointed Lieutenant General Hassan Daoud Kabroon Kiyan as Minister of Defense, and Police Lieutenant General Babiker Samra Mustafa Ali as Minister of Interior. He affirmed that the government formation would be based on “independent technocrats” rather than political party affiliates, according to Sudan’s official news agency SUNA.

Control Over Sovereign Ministries

The early decision to assign the Defense and Interior Ministries to senior figures from the army and police was seen as a clear message from Idris that the sovereign ministries would remain under the control of the army and its leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who has ruled the country since the military coup that ousted the civilian government in October 2021. The rest of the cabinet positions remain under negotiation—particularly key economic ministries like Finance and Minerals—around which the fiercest disputes with the armed movements revolve.

Eyes on Gold: Intensifying Resource Conflict

Sources within the Port Sudan camp indicate that the real dispute is not just about the percentage of representation for armed groups, but the extent of their control over ministries that manage revenues from gold and the country’s natural resources.

While Idris insists on avoiding a quota-based system, the armed movements view these ministries as guarantees for their political and military interests. They have rejected symbolic representation or the appointment of second-tier technocrats under the label of “independents.” On the other hand, Sudan’s Islamist movement known as the “Kizan”—practically the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—has been steadily regaining influence over state institutions since the war began, taking advantage of the post-2019 chaos following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist regime.

Tense Negotiations and Public Protests

In an effort to contain the crisis, Idris held a meeting with 21 political and military organizations, including Minni Arko Minnawi, Abu Aqla Kikel, and Mohamed Eljakum. However, the meeting was turbulent, with Minnawi storming out in protest after being excluded from the cabinet. Leaks suggest Idris favored nominations submitted by Kikel and Eljakum, which was interpreted as an indication that the new government is leaning toward reducing the influence of traditional armed movements.

Trust Crisis With the Army: Red Lines Drawn

Military sources said that the army leadership expressed strong dissatisfaction with Minnawi’s position and sent him a delegation including two deputy directors of intelligence and security. The message was firm: continued pressure would lead to the replacement of his forces with Arab fighters from the north and center, especially after certain Zaghawa factions were accused of underperformance in battle.

On-the-Ground Signals: Border Withdrawal and Silent Messages

The armed movements didn’t limit themselves to political objections. On June 11, they executed a surprise withdrawal from the strategic border triangle area between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, without engaging the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in battle.

The army claimed the withdrawal was for “defensive purposes,” but in reality, the move reflects a deep divergence in priorities between the army and the movements at a critical moment in the war. Sudanese sources confirmed that the area was effectively handed over after direct communication between armed group leaders and RSF commanders.

Consequences of Defeats in Kordofan: A Fragmenting Alliance

The Sudanese army’s major defeat at the end of May in Kordofan—especially the fall of Al-Debibat city and key areas like Al-Khuwi, Al-Hammadi, and Umm Sumayma—further weakened the military-political alliance in Port Sudan.

These losses triggered a wave of internal accusations of “treason,” especially following the death of General Ihab Mohamed Youssef Al-Tayyib, one of the army’s most prominent commanders.

The Sudanese newspaper Idrak cited informed sources saying some armed movement leaders are seriously considering opening communication channels with the RSF, seeing the alliance with the army as a strategic mistake—particularly as they perceive the military to be increasingly influenced by “extremist Islamist factions.”

Summary: A Government Under Siege

Despite its rhetoric of technocracy and independence, the Idris government faces real structural challenges.

It is squeezed between an army seeking to consolidate full power and armed movements that see key ministries as essential levers of influence. Meanwhile, battlefield losses continue to erode Port Sudan’s leverage.

The pressing question now is: Can Idris succeed in forming a balanced government that satisfies all sides, or will old alliances collapse under the pressure of gold and battlefield realities?